ANNEXATION LAW - TEXAS SUPREME COURT CASES
City of Rockwall, Texas v. Hughes, No. 05-0126 (Tex. Jan 25, 2008) (Johnson) (annexation, arbitration
construction of statutory provision governing arbitration of municipal annexation disputes)
THE CITY OF ROCKWALL, TEXAS v. VESTER T. HUGHES, AS SOLE INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF W. W. CARUTH, DECEASED; from Rockwall County; 5th district (05-04-01562-CV, 153 S.W.3d
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice
Medina, and Justice Green joined.
Justice Willett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Hecht, Justice O'Neill, and Justice Brister joined.
RECENT COURT OF APPEALS CASES IN WHICH SUPREME COURT DENIED
LONE STAR STORAGE TRAILER, II LTD. AND LONE STAR STORAGE TRAILER v. VILLAGE OF SALADO; from
Bell County; 3rd district (03-06-00572-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 04-10-09)
(declaratory judgment action to declare annexation ordinance void)
The Village of Salado (the "Village") annexed property along its eastern boundary, including property owned by
Lone Star Storage Trailer II, Ltc. and Lone Star Storage Trailer (cumulatively, "Lone Star"). Lone Star filed a
declaratory judgment action, asking the district court to declare the annexation ordinance void. Both the Village
and Lone Star filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted Lone Star's motion, denied the
Village's motion, and declared the ordinance void. The Village appeals the judgment of the district court. We will
reverse the judgment of the district court in part, render judgment in part, and remand for further proceedings.
In light of the preceding, we reverse the district court's judgment granting Lone Star's motion for summary
judgment, denying the Village's motion for summary judgment, and declaring the annexation void. Further, we
render judgment that the annexation ordinance is valid and enforceable. Finally, because the Village sought
attorney's fees in its motion for summary judgment, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009 (West 2008)
(allowing court to issue attorney's fees in declaratory judgment action), we remand that issue to the district court
so that it may determine what amount of attorney's fees, if any, the Village is entitled to.
CITY OF GRANBURY v. CITY OF CRESSON; from Hood County; 2nd district (02‑06‑00227‑CV, 245 SW3d 61,
01‑10‑08)(municipal annexation dispute in which the cities of Cresson and Granbury both claim jurisdiction over
This case involves a municipal annexation dispute in which the cities of Cresson and Granbury both claim
jurisdiction over property. Appellant, the City of Cresson, appeals from the district court=s (1) summary
judgment in favor of appellee, the City of Granbury, and (2) denial of summary judgment for Cresson. In three
issues, Cresson contends that the provisions of the Municipal Annexation Act control over the common law first-
in-time rule and that its extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) expansion ordinances passed at the request of property
owners are not void as claimed by Granbury. We reverse the judgment in favor of Granbury and render
judgment for Cresson.
JNC PARTNERS DENTON, LLC v. CITY OF DENTON, TEXAS; from Denton County; 2nd district
(02-05-00439-CV, 190 SW3d 790, 03-23-06, pet. denied Feb. 2008) stay order issued April 6, 2006, lifted
(temporary injunction appeal, city annexation plan, arbitration)
Appellant JNC Partners Denton, LLC appeals from the trial court's denial of its request for a temporary injunction
enjoining Appellee City of Denton from annexing JNC's property. The underlying issue is whether JNC has
shown a probable right to compel arbitration under section 43.052(i) of the local government code. See Tex.
Loc. Gov't Code Ann. ' 43.052(i) (Vernon Supp. 2005). We affirm the trial court's order denying the temporary
JNC presented no evidence that tended to show that Denton proposed to annex two or more areas as described
in section 43.052(h). Thus, JNC failed to prove a probable right to arbitration under section 43.052(i). We
therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying JNC's request for a temporary injunction.